Life of the Land’s Bioenergy Journey: Fighting for Honest Energy in Hawai’i

by | Jun 1, 2026 | Case Updates, News & Blog

Life of the Land (LOL) is one of Hawai’i’s oldest environmental advocacy organizations, founded in 1970 and still fighting today. While many people think of energy policy as something decided in boardrooms or government offices, LOL has spent decades showing up — at Public Utilities Commission (PUC) hearings, in courtrooms, and in community meetings — to make sure ordinary residents have a voice in decisions that determine what shows up on their electric bills and in their air.

 

This is the story of LOL’s long, complicated, and often surprising involvement in bioenergy — the use of plants, trees, and agricultural products to generate electricity. It’s a story with heroes and villains, greenwashing and genuine innovation, billion-dollar lawsuits, and a landmark Hawaii Supreme Court victory that changed how the state thinks about clean energy.

 

First, a Lesson That Still Matters: Heptachlor

 

Before diving into bioenergy, it’s worth remembering what taught LOL to always ask hard questions about what goes into our food and energy systems.

 

In March 1982, the majority of O’ahu’s milk supply was found to be contaminated with a pesticide called heptachlor. It came from pineapple green chop — the leafy material left over from pineapple processing — that was fed to dairy cows. The pesticide built up in the cows and ended up in the milk that families were drinking.

 

LOL joined the Conservation Council for Hawai’i and the Childcare Switchboard in a class action lawsuit, winning a $1 million settlement from Foremost and a $3 million settlement from Meadow Gold. Those funds created a medical monitoring program and the Hawai’i Heptachlor Research Education Foundation.

 

The Honolulu Advertiser editorial in June 1986 called it “a victory for consumers — led in this case by the Conservation Council of Hawai’i, Life of the Land and the Childcare Switchboard”.

 

Why does this matter to bioenergy? Because it taught LOL that agricultural systems can cause harm in ways that aren’t visible at first glance — and that someone needs to ask the hard questions.

 

What Is Bioenergy — and Why Does It Matter?

 

Bioenergy means generating electricity or fuel by burning or processing organic material: crops, trees, cooking oil, animal fat, or agricultural waste. The idea is appealing — instead of burning coal or oil drilled from the ground, you’re burning something that grew recently, so the carbon it releases was recently absorbed from the atmosphere.

 

But it’s more complicated than that. How the material is grown, where it comes from, and what else gets destroyed in the process all determine whether a bioenergy project is actually good for the climate — or worse than coal.

 

This is exactly what LOL has been wrestling with for two decades.

 

The Ethanol Detour (2005)

 

HECO’s entry into bioenergy started with ethanol. In 2005, the utility proposed powering its planned new Campbell Industrial Park generating station partly on ethanol, hoping to jump-start a local Hawaiian ethanol industry. HECO CEO T. Michael May said he hoped the initiative would “encourage the local production of ethanol” and help create an agricultural energy business in Hawai’i.

 

LOL intervened in PUC Docket 2005-0145 and brought in world-class expert Dr. Tadeusz Patzek, then a professor at UC Berkeley and one of the world’s foremost authorities on biofuels. Dr. Patzek explained the full lifecycle of ethanol — the fossil fuels needed to make fertilizer, run farm machinery, and process the crops, and especially the greenhouse gases released from the soil.

 

The three leading sources of greenhouse gases in the ethanol production process, Dr. Patzek testified, are: (1) conversion of plant material into ethanol, (2) oxidation of humus in the soil, and (3) the use of nitrogen fertilizer.

 

HECO built its entire case around biofuels — but sponsored no biofuel witnesses and refused to cross-examine Dr. Patzek. The PUC approved the HECO proposal. Shortly after, HECO quietly switched from promoting ethanol to promoting something far more controversial: palm oil.

 

Stopping Palm Oil Power: Imperium Renewables (2005–2007)

 

This is where bioenergy got truly global — and troubling.

 

HECO proposed burning palm oil biodiesel from Southeast Asian rainforests at its Campbell Industrial Park plant. The palm oil would be refined by Imperium Renewables in Seattle, then shipped to Hawai’i. Initially, HECO suggested a 50/50 blend of biodiesel and regular diesel — but eventually, under pressure from the Consumer Advocate, agreed the goal should be 100% biodiesel.

 

The problem? Palm oil production in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Borneo is associated with massive deforestation, destruction of orangutan habitat, displacement of Indigenous peoples, and the use of slash-and-burn techniques that release huge amounts of carbon into the atmosphere. Burning rainforest biofuel can actually produce more greenhouse gases than coal.

 

The NRDC Guidelines — and Their Failures

 

HECO partnered with the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) to develop “sustainable palm oil” guidelines. But LOL immediately identified the problem: the NRDC guidelines only required HECO to comply with 6 of the 39 already-weak industry standards set by the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO). And those 6 standards only had to be met at the specific plantation supplying Hawai’i — what the same company did on other plantations was irrelevant. Child labor was acceptable, so long as the plantation was “working towards” better practices.

 

LOL co-wrote a critique with KAHEA, the Ilioula’okalani Coalition, Sierra Club-Maui, and the Environmental Defense Fund — a document ultimately endorsed by organizations in 13 countries, including 28 Hawai’i groups and 20 groups from 10 Indonesian provinces.

 

LOL brought 16 expert witnesses to the PUC evidentiary hearing, including environmental justice scholars, biodiesel experts, and international rainforest specialists. The PUC rejected the proposal outright.

 

Eventually, HECO was forced to switch its position to support all 39 of the weak RSPO standards. Imperium, meanwhile, was barely staying afloat — purchasing Canadian canola, refining it in Seattle, and losing its major customers as Europe imposed tariffs on U.S. biofuel subsidies and the EPA drafted new rules requiring lifecycle carbon accounting. The PUC also rejected a backup proposal involving Aloha Petroleum as a middle-man. Imperium was dead.

 

A Hawaii Original: Pacific Biodiesel

 

Not all biofuel is the same — and LOL has consistently tried to distinguish harmful large-scale industrial biofuels from genuine community-based alternatives.

 

Pacific Biodiesel, headquartered in Kahului, Maui, started in 1995 out of a very practical problem: the Central Maui Landfill had unmanageable quantities of used cooking oil from restaurants. Robert King, then owner of King Diesel, proposed converting that waste oil into biodiesel to fuel the landfill’s generators. Within a year, it was reality — and Pacific Biodiesel opened what became recognized as one of the first commercially viable biodiesel plants in the U.S.

 

Pacific Biodiesel has since grown to process both cooking oil waste and grease trap waste, and has even experimented with sunflower crops on Maui as a locally grown feedstock. This model — small-scale, local, using waste feedstocks — is precisely the kind of community-based biofuel that LOL supports. It creates local jobs, diverts waste from landfills, and avoids the rainforest destruction of industrial palm oil.

 

Blue Earth Biofuels and the Broader Picture

 

Blue Earth Biofuels was among many companies that entered Hawaii’s biofuel market during the boom years of the mid-2000s, attracted by state renewable energy goals and the potential for long-term utility contracts. LOL tracked these companies carefully, recognizing that the state’s renewable energy law created strong financial incentives for biofuel projects — but that not all of them were genuinely clean or locally beneficial.

 

The critical question for any biofuel project is: what feedstock is being used, where does it come from, and what is its full lifecycle carbon footprint? Companies like Blue Earth Biofuels occupied the spectrum between Pacific Biodiesel’s waste-oil model and Imperium’s tropical rainforest model — and the public deserved to know where any given company stood.

 

The Hamakua Land Grab (2008)

 

LOL’s engagement with bioenergy extended beyond the PUC into land use politics. In the fall of 2008, then-Governor Linda Lingle’s administration attempted to use the Board of Land and Natural Resources (BLNR) to force Big Island ranchers with existing state leases along the Hamakua Coast to negotiate with new biofuel producers — and if they refused, to break their leases using an expedited approval process.

 

The catch: the ranchers were never told the Land Board was meeting to discuss breaking their leases.

 

State legislators pushed back hard. Senators Clayton Hee, Russell Kokubun, and Dwight Takamine joined Representative Mark Nakashima in a legislative hearing in Hilo in December 2008. Henry Curtis flew to Hilo, met with Hamakua community members and farmers, and filmed the hearing. The land grab was stopped.

 

This episode illustrates a recurring theme in bioenergy policy: real farmers and ranchers can get squeezed out in favor of outside energy developers, even when the stated goal is agricultural self-sufficiency.

 

What Is “Renewable Energy” Anyway? Definitions Matter

 

One of LOL’s most important — and least flashy — contributions has been its persistent scrutiny of how Hawai’i defines renewable energy in law.

 

Hawai’i’s Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) law, first passed in 2001, is supposed to guarantee that a growing percentage of our electricity comes from clean sources. But the definition of “renewable energy” has been rewritten five times — in 2001, 2004, 2006, 2009, and 2011 — and each version included or excluded different things.

 

Some examples of how slippery these definitions have been:

 

The 2006 law said biofuels are always renewable — even if they are made entirely from fossil fuels

 

The 2004 law counted “quantifiable energy conservation measures” as renewable energy — a term that was never defined

 

The H-POWER garbage incinerator on O’ahu counts as renewable energy under Hawaii law — meaning burning trash counts toward our clean energy goals

 

As LOL has noted: “Renewable Energy is not a scientific term — it is a political term that changes in time and place.” Whether a particular energy source gets counted depends not on physics or climate science, but on who was in the room when the law was written.

 

This matters enormously for bioenergy. Under the 2006 law, palm oil biodiesel from Indonesian rainforests was fully renewable — earning HECO the same RPS credit as rooftop solar. The label “renewable” can mean almost anything, which is why LOL insists on full lifecycle greenhouse gas analysis rather than category labels.

 

Preferential Agricultural Rates: A Law That Was Never Used

 

In 2009, the Hawaii Legislature passed Act 185 (HB 591), which authorized preferential rates for the purchase of renewable energy produced in conjunction with agricultural activities.

 

The idea was sound: help existing farmers by giving them an additional revenue stream. If a rancher installed a small hydroelectric generator on an irrigation flume, or a farmer put up solar panels, they could sell the excess electricity to the utility at a better rate. The Hawaii Farm Bureau testified in favor, citing the sugarcane model where plantations once powered entire communities.

 

But LOL found that the law has very few words, is confusing, and has never been used.

 

LOL’s analysis revealed that the law’s intent was to help existing farmers supplement their income — not to subsidize large corporate energy projects that happen to sit on agricultural land. The distinction matters: policy should support real farmers, not allow developers to claim agricultural preferences while displacing the farming community.

 

Aina Koa Pono: When LOL Saved Ratepayers $26.5 Million Per Year (2011–2013)

 

In January 2011, HECO and its Big Island subsidiary HELCO signed a 20-year biodiesel supply contract with Aina Koa Pono (AKP), a startup that proposed to grow trees, brush, and crops on 12,000 acres of Ka’ū lands in Wood Valley on the Big Island, vaporize the feedstock using a novel microwave process, and truck the resulting biofuel to the Keahole power plant.

 

There was one enormous problem: the price. LOL calculated that AKP’s biodiesel would cost approximately $170 per barrel — compared to roughly $90 per barrel for petroleum fuel at the time. The hidden cost to ratepayers would be approximately $26.5 million per year, or a nine-figure sum over the life of the contract.

 

LOL was initially denied intervenor status in the first round of PUC proceedings (Docket 2011-0005). But its financial analysis was placed into the record anyway — and when the PUC issued its decision unanimously rejecting the AKP contract in September 2011, it quoted Henry Curtis’s calculation directly, attributing it to “Mr. Henry Curtis, Executive Director, Life of the Land.” This was one of only two independent estimates the PUC highlighted in justifying its rejection.

 

The PUC found the price “excessive, not cost-effective, and thus unreasonable and inconsistent with the public interest” — notably overriding the Consumer Advocate’s recommendation to approve.

 

AKP and HECO returned with a revised contract claiming $125 million in savings. This time LOL was admitted into the proceedings. Ka’ū residents also showed up to oppose AKP’s operations, citing noise, truck traffic through Pahala, and no community benefits package. The PUC rejected the revised contract again on December 26, 2013.

 

The Value of Hawai’i: Knowing the Past, Shaping the Future

 

In 2010, the University of Hawai’i Press published “The Value of Hawai’i: Knowing the Past, Shaping the Future,” edited by Craig Howes and Jon Osorio. Henry Curtis wrote the energy chapter.

 

In that chapter, Curtis laid out the full scope of what an honest bioenergy policy must grapple with: the lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions from agricultural production, the soil carbon dynamics that most energy analyses ignore, the water demands of energy crops, and the historical context of Hawai’i’s agriculture. He cited UN Environment Programme Executive Director Achim Steiner: “Biofuels are a subject that has triggered sharply polarized views… simplistic approaches are unlikely to deliver a sustainable biofuels industry.”

 

The chapter also raised a warning that remains relevant today: Hawaii relies on imports for more than 90% of its food. Converting agricultural land to energy crops risks making a food-insecure state even more dependent on outside supplies.

 

The Hu Honua Battle: Fifteen Years Fighting Forest-Burning (2008–2023)

 

The longest single energy campaign in LOL’s history began in 2008, when Hu Honua Bioenergy LLC proposed clearcutting Big Island forests, pulverizing the trees into wood chips, and burning them to generate electricity — labeling this “renewable energy” with “net zero carbon emissions”.

 

LOL challenged the fundamental premise from day one: burning forests releases carbon immediately, while regrowing trees takes decades. The lifecycle greenhouse gas analysis showed Hu Honua to be carbon-intensive — not carbon neutral.

 

How the numbers stacked up: Hu Honua’s greenhouse gas intensity: 2,697 kg CO₂e per MWh. Solar alternatives: 49–93 kg CO₂e per MWh. Total projected air pollution over 30 years: ~8 million metric tons. Consumer cost: approximately $10.97 per month added to each electricity bill.

 

The PUC initially approved the project in 2013. Hu Honua failed several milestones and HECO cancelled the project. Hu Honus sued in federal court. A settlement was reached. A new Power Purchase Agreement was filed with the PUC. The PUC approved the agreement.

 

LOL appealed to the Hawai’i Supreme Court. In May 2019, the Court issued a landmark 66-page ruling agreeing with LOL on two counts: (1) the PUC failed to consider greenhouse gas emissions as required by statute, and (2) the PUC had denied LOL due process under the state constitution’s guarantee of a clean and healthful environment.

 

Back at the PUC on remand, Hu Honua sent 800 emails to the Commission demanding approval and actually filed a motion to permanently ban LOL from all future PUC proceedings — calling the organization too “persistent, determined, and committed”.

 

The PUC voted 2-1 to reject Hu Honua’s PPA in May 2022. On March 13, 2023, the Hawai’i Supreme Court unanimously upheld the rejection in a 5-0 ruling, declaring that “yesterdays good enough has become todays unacceptable” and that the PUC has a constitutional duty to balance technical, economic, environmental, and cultural considerations.

 

Attorney Chase Livingston publicly credited Henry Curtis for “keeping the matter burning before regulators and the courts over more than a decade”.

 

Wildfires: When Energy Policy Becomes a Matter of Life and Death

 

On August 8, 2023, wind-driven wildfires destroyed most of Lāhainā, Maui — killing over 100 people and destroying approximately 2,200 structures, making it the deadliest U.S. wildfire in over a century.

 

Hawaiian Electric’s power lines fell in high winds and started a fire that morning. The Maui County Fire Department declared it contained by 9:55 a.m. — and left. A reignition in the afternoon destroyed the town.

 

LOL filed detailed comments, asserting that excluding the public from PUC proceedings about wildfire safety expenditures “is a violation of Due Process to approve expenditures that will ultimately be paid by the ratepayer while excluding the public from participating”.

 

LOL’s central critique: HECO has a pattern of responding only to the most recent disaster — first hurricanes, then wildfires — rather than planning holistically. A wildfire mitigation plan must be one pillar within a broader Hazard Mitigation Plan that addresses wildfires, hurricanes, floods, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, and cyberattacks together.

 

LOL also broadened the frame of responsibility: a 2018 Lāhainā fire nearly destroyed the town but was stopped by a sudden wind shift. In the five years between 2018 and 2023, neither the county nor landowners took action to remove the dead vegetation that served as fuel. Utility accountability matters — but it doesn’t exist in isolation.

 

Carbon Offsets and Additionality: The Shell Game of Climate Accounting

 

As Hawai’i moves toward its 100% renewable energy goal, a critical question has emerged: can a company buy its way out of emissions — paying someone else to reduce pollution somewhere else, while continuing to pollute here?

 

This is the world of carbon offsets. LOL’s position is one of deep skepticism.

 

In testimony in the Hawai’i Gas rate case, LOL argued that offset-style accounting allows a polluter to claim that emissions reductions “somewhere else” cancel out continued local pollution — without requiring any actual reduction at the source. LOL cited the Kyoto Protocol as a cautionary tale: the Protocol’s targets were “completely offset by net emission transfers,” also known as leakage.

 

The academic literature that LOL relies on makes this problem precise. The core concept is additionality: an offset is only valid if the emissions reduction would not have happened anyway without the offset payment. In plain English: if a forest was never going to be cut down regardless, paying someone to “protect” it doesn’t reduce global emissions by one gram.

 

The Greenhouse Gas Management Institute’s foundational papers on additionality explain that most major offset programs — including the UN’s Clean Development Mechanism — are built on circular definitions: they define a baseline as “what would have happened without the project,” then use the project itself to define what would have happened. This is like asking whether a law reduced crime by comparing it to a world without the law — but then using the law’s own existence to define that imaginary law-free world.

 

For Hawai’i specifically, LOL advocates for full lifecycle greenhouse gas accounting using a consumption-based accounting system, which attributes emissions to where goods are consumed rather than where they are produced — a framework validated by the Hawai’i Supreme Court’s unanimous 2020 ruling in the Hawai’i Gas appeal.

 

The lesson: not all carbon offsets are equal, and many are near-worthless. Any bioenergy or carbon offset proposal deserves rigorous, independent scrutiny of its additionality claims.

 

Agriculturally Based Carbon Offsets: Promise and Peril

 

Agriculture can sequester carbon — in soil, in trees, in grasslands. And farmers deserve support for managing their land in ways that benefit the climate. But LOL has consistently warned that agricultural carbon offset markets are among the hardest to make credible.

 

The reasons are deeply technical. Agricultural lifecycle analysis (LCA) must account for: changes in land use and crop displacement, nitrogen emissions from fertilizers, changes in carbon storage in soils (where a large percentage of terrestrial carbon actually lives), water use and irrigation, and pesticide and fertilizer runoff.

 

When soil is tilled, carbon stored over decades can be released in a single season. When nitrogen fertilizers are applied, they generate nitrous oxide — a greenhouse gas 300 times more potent than CO₂. These factors make agricultural carbon accounting extraordinarily complex, and easy to manipulate.

 

LOL’s position: agricultural carbon offsets should be held to the highest standards of additionality and verification — and should never be used to justify continued fossil fuel burning or ecologically destructive bioenergy projects.

 

What LOL Stands For: The Big Picture

 

After two decades of bioenergy battles, LOL’s position can be summarized simply:

 

Not all bioenergy is renewable. Not all renewables are clean. Labels don’t substitute for science.

 

The questions that matter are: What is the feedstock, and where does it come from? What is the full lifecycle greenhouse gas footprint — from soil to smokestack? What is the cost to ratepayers, especially low-income families? Are local farmers and communities benefiting — or being displaced by corporate developers? Is the “renewable energy” label actually reducing emissions, or just moving accounting around?

 

LOL has shown, repeatedly, that these questions can be answered — and that when they are answered honestly, many bioenergy proposals that looked green on the surface turn out to be neither clean nor beneficial for Hawai’i’s communities.

 

The fight continues. With new proposals for firm renewable power always emerging, and with carbon offset markets growing in complexity, the lessons of Imperium, AKP, and Hu Honua remain as relevant as ever.

 

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