Life of the Land opposes the liquefied natural gas (LNG) bridge to divert attention away from a decarbonized renewable energy future. Life of the Land is hoping for the best but planning for the worst.
A proposal to import liquefied natural gas to Oʻahu faces serious problems on every front — economic, legal, environmental, and geopolitical — and the community deserves to know all of them.
Billion Dollar Error
The Hawaii State Energy Office (HSEO) produced a scenario for the importation of LNG that had a series of errors totaling $1.2 billion. HSEO reverted to the earlier rejected Scenario 1A.
The University of Hawaii Economic Research Organization (UHERO), Hawaii Natural Energy Institute (HNEI) and the Hawaii House Committee on Energy and Environmental Policy assert that Scenario 1A does not provide a robust basis for LNG policy decisions. The fragile, assumption‑stacked case has modeling errors, weak sensitivity analysis, and reliance on a narrow set of favorable assumptions.
Beyond the $1.2 billion spreadsheet error already noted, the House Energy Committee, UHERO, and HNEI have all stated that no remaining HSEO scenario provides a “robust basis for LNG policy decisions”. This institutional credibility gap means any PUC proceeding will face an uphill battle establishing a credible evidentiary record in support of the project — a foundational requirement for PUC approval.
US-Iran War Impacts LNG Supplies
About 20% of the world’s total petroleum liquids flow through the Strait of Hormuz
The U.S.–Israel launched a war against Iran. Iranian forces declared the Strait of Hormuz “closed.” Iran damaged regional oil and gas assets and attacked Qatar’s LNG infrastructure, halting all of Qatar’s exports — one of the world’s largest LNG producers — sending shockwaves through European and Asian natural gas markets. Every major post-February 28 source confirms the thesis that LNG markets are not returning to a pre-war baseline. Qatar’s export halt, Hormuz closure risk, and the inability of the U.S. to rapidly scale exports all reinforce that any LNG import scenario for Hawaii must be evaluated against a structurally higher-cost, higher-risk global LNG market.
On March 25, 2026, the Wall Street Journal published an article — The World’s Energy Safety Net Is Buckling: The Iran war has hit every node in the supply chain for liquefied natural gas.
“For decades, liquefied natural gas acted as the global economy’s reliable escape valve during energy crises, keeping factories humming and homes warm. Now, LNG has become the battlefield itself. The war in Iran has fractured every node of the regional LNG supply chain.”
“Unlike crude, the world has no major strategic gas reserve to tap in an emergency… The LNG crunch threatens wealthy nations with a prolonged wave of energy-driven inflation… This new reality undermines LNG’s longtime reputation as a geopolitical safety net.”
Stranded Asset and Fossil Lock-In Risk
The reuse arguments — FSRU relocation and power plant conversion to hydrogen/ammonia — are not baseless, but they are substantially speculative and carry enough embedded assumptions and costs to undermine their use as justifications for the LNG investment. Here is a clear-eyed assessment of each claim:
FSRU Relocation: Technically Possible, Economically Uncertain
FSRUs are, by design, mobile assets and have been repositioned between global ports. The relocation argument is not pure fiction — there is a secondary market for FSRUs, and vessels have been converted and redeployed.
However, the critical flaw in applying this argument to Hawaii is who bears the financial risk of relocation. In a PUC-approved rate base model, ratepayers would likely fund the FSRU through the capital stack. If the asset is relocated, it would need to be sold or transferred — and the recovery of that value for ratepayers is far from guaranteed.
The secondary market price for a 15-year-old FSRU in 2045, in a world aggressively decarbonizing, is deeply uncertain. Moreover, the subsea pipeline and buoy cannot be relocated — they are fixed infrastructure with no reuse pathway, and HSEO’s own future scenario shows both out of service by 2045. Those two components alone represent a meaningful portion of the $412 million offshore capital stack.
Power Plant Hydrogen/Ammonia Conversion: Highly Speculative
HSEO’s Scenario 1A explicitly assumes that parts of the LNG buildout can later be reused for green hydrogen or ammonia, and claims this avoids significant future capital costs. This is where the argument becomes most vulnerable. Several layers of speculation are stacked on top of each other:
Green hydrogen at utility scale in Hawaii by 2045 is unproven. No commercial-scale green hydrogen import terminal operates anywhere in the Pacific today.
Ammonia-to-power conversion requires substantial retrofitting. Capital costs for green ammonia plants range from $496 million to over $900 million, and turbine retrofits for ammonia combustion add further cost and technical risk.
Fuel delivery infrastructure is not compatible. An LNG FSRU and subsea pipeline are designed for cryogenic methane. Ammonia and hydrogen require entirely different materials, pressures, and handling systems — the pipeline and buoy are not simply repurposed.
The model has already been discredited. UHERO and HNEI have explicitly identified the hydrogen reuse assumption as one of the “favorable assumptions” propping up Scenario 1A’s positive net present value. Without that reuse credit, the economic case weakens or disappears entirely.
The Core Problem: Stranded Asset Risk Is Asymmetric
The reuse arguments shift the burden of proof — they require advocates of LNG to demonstrate that reuse will happen on a commercially viable timeline, not merely that it could happen. In a PUC contested case, intervenors will demand specific evidence: engineering feasibility studies, cost estimates, contractual commitments, and market demand analyses for hydrogen or ammonia in the 2040s. Vague future optionality is not a substitute for that evidence. As CleanTechnica’s analysis of Scenario 1A concluded, the offshore assets — FSRU, buoy, and subsea pipeline — “are not bridging to the future. They are stranded.”
LNG Environmental Impacts
The International Energy Agency (IEA) noted that “there is a broad range of emissions from extracting, processing and transporting natural gas, which vary by more than five-fold across different geographies.”
A recent study published in Energy Science & Engineering found that liquefied natural gas (LNG) has greenhouse gas emissions that are worse than coal. https://doi.org/10.1002/ese3.1934
“Liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports from the United States have risen dramatically since the LNG-export ban was lifted in 2016, and the United States is now the world’s largest exporter.
“This LNG is produced largely from shale gas. Production of shale gas, as well as liquefaction to make LNG and LNG transport by tanker, is energy-intensive, which contributes significantly to the LNG greenhouse gas footprint. The production and transport of shale gas emits a substantial amount of methane as well, and liquefaction and tanker transport of LNG can further increase methane emissions.”
Agencies Cant Exceed Statutory Mandate
The Hawaii State Energy Office mission and role is found in HRS §196-71 and -72. Words not mentioned even once include the terms: fossil, fuel, gas, petroleum, and oil.
HRS §196-71 states that “The purpose of the Hawaii state energy office shall be to promote energy efficiency, renewable energy, and clean transportation to help achieve a resilient clean energy economy … The Hawaii state energy office shall be the State’s primary government entity for supporting the clean energy initiative.” HRS §196-71.
HRS §196-72 states that The Office can advance the discussion involving many issues. “Formulate, analyze, recommend, and implement specific policies, strategies, and plans, in coordination with public and private sector stakeholders, to cost-effectively and equitably achieve the State’s energy goals… Advocate for the State’s energy and decarbonization goals at relevant venues and departments, including but not limited to the public utilities commission, legislature, and division of consumer advocacy, to ensure that state energy policies and regulations align with the state strategic goals and are data-driven.”
No Agency May Play Favoritism
The Hawaii State Ethics Commission’s mission is to preserve public confidence by ensuring that officials avoid even the appearance of favoritism.
Advocating for one unnamed or named applicant before the application exists risks being seen as predetermining the outcome, which undermines trust in the PUC process and in HSEO’s neutrality.
State agencies are expected to ensure equal opportunity and fair competition for state contracts and PUC‑approved arrangements.
Pushing the PUC to approve one specific entity before a filed application is a breach of good‑government norms.
The PUC Path Forward
JERA may wait for HECO to issue the next Public Utilities Commission (PUC) approved Request for Proposals (RFP). HECO will evaluate all bids, then draft a proposed Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) and file it with the PUC. Intervenors will be accepted in the proceeding. Without an appeal, the process will take a minimum of three years.
Alternatively, HECO but not JERA, may ask for a waiver from competitive bidding. The last time the PUC approved a waiver from competitive bidding was for the proposed Hu Honua project in 2017. Intervention is allowed in waiver requests.
Contested Case Proceeding
End with the full scope of legal hurdles — BLNR, HDOT, and PUC. Closing on the procedural obstacles reinforces the central message: even if you wanted this project, it faces years of legal scrutiny where the public can be heard. This is an empowering note to end on for a community advocacy audience.
JERA was a party in a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) proceeding. FERC docket ER25-3327 was an initial market-based rate (MBR) tariff application — a routine, largely administrative proceeding in which JERA Americas Energy Services LLC was the sole named applicant.
There is no indication that JERA has ever been in a contested case proceeding.
If JERA moves forward with this application, they will likely be a party in three contested case proceedings: Board of Land and Natural Resources (BLNR) regarding use of the ocean, Hawaii Department of Transportation (HDOT) regarding use and upgrades of Kalaeloa Harbor, and the Public Utilities Commission regarding a power purchase agreement with Hawaiian Electric.
Regulatory Issues
Hawaii Environmental Review (HEPA/EIS)
The LNG project would almost certainly trigger Hawaii’s environmental review process under HRS §343-5, requiring either an Environmental Assessment (EA) or a full Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). The offshore FSRU, subsea pipeline, and new power plant would likely require a full EIS — a multi-year process subject to public comment, legal challenges, and potential non-acceptance by the reviewing agency. This is a separate and parallel track from the BLNR, HDOT, and PUC contested case proceedings already mentioned in your document.
Jones Act / Shipping Constraint
The Jones Act effectively blocks Hawaii from acquiring domestic U.S. LNG because no Jones Act-compliant LNG tankers exist in the U.S. fleet. This forces Hawaii to rely exclusively on foreign-sourced LNG shipped on foreign-flagged vessels, adding cost and supply chain complexity. A Jones Act-compliant articulated tug-barge (ATB) for LNG transport alone has been estimated at $120 million in additional infrastructure cost.
CFIUS / Foreign Investment Review
JERA is a Japanese company, and its proposal involves acquiring significant infrastructure interests near a maritime port. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) has expanded jurisdiction since 2018 to review foreign acquisitions of real estate or infrastructure near sensitive facilities, including maritime ports. An FSRU moored offshore near Kalaeloa Harbor could trigger a CFIUS review that delays or conditions the project.
Hawaii’s 100% RPS Legal Obligation
Hawaii law (HRS §269-92) mandates 100% renewable portfolio standard by 2045 — a legally binding obligation on Hawaiian Electric. An LNG power purchase agreement locking in fossil fuel generation through 2040 or beyond would need to demonstrate compatibility with this mandate, which intervenors at the PUC would almost certainly contest as inconsistent with the utility’s statutory obligations.
Infrastructure Cost Overrun Risk
Independent analysis has consistently found that LNG import infrastructure projects are subject to significant cost overruns. The FSRU, buoy, and subsea pipeline alone have been framed in a range of $400 million (charter) to $700 million (purchase) scenarios, not counting the power plant. Real-world reference class data for floating import terminals shows high variance in both capital cost and commissioning timelines — a risk that would ultimately fall on ratepayers.
Timeline Mismatch
Assuming HECO signed a deal with JERA, there is instant permit approval for all permits, there are no appeals, no time delays, and no cost overruns, then the LNG power plant could be operational in 2030. A lot of ifs.
The JERA proposal consists of five subsystems: Floating Storage and Regasification Unit (FSRU) procurement & installation; Subsea pipeline and Onshore Receiving Facility (ORF); Onshore gas pipeline; Power plant; and Interconnection/transformers.
An FSRU converts liquid natural gas into high-pressure natural gas — an invisible, compressible vapor that must travel through a pipeline under pressure. The entire point of the subsea pipeline in JERA’s proposal is that a pipeline carries this gas from the FSRU to shore.
Barges carry liquids or solids, not pressurized gas streams. In theory, barges could bring LNG ashore to be re-gasified. This would involve less fuel transferred, more vessels, more operations, more failure points — each ship-to-ship transfer carries spill, fire, and collision risk, requiring its own permitting and safety review.
JERA would need to contract with a third-party FSRU owner-operator to built the facility since JERA is a power generator and LNG buyer — not an FSRU developer, shipowner, or marine infrastructure builder.
This has several important implications for assessing JERA’s proposal:
JERA controls the power plant timeline but does not control the FSRU delivery timeline — that depends entirely on a third party’s shipyard contracts and vessel availability.
Cost overrun risk is split across two separate entities with different incentives, contracts, and financing — adding complexity and potential for disputes.
No FSRU is currently contracted for Hawaii — JERA’s proposal is at the concept stage, meaning vessel procurement hasn’t started, and the global FSRU market is currently very tight due to European demand.
The interface risk between the FSRU operator and JERA’s onshore infrastructure (subsea pipeline, ORF, power plant) is itself a known source of cost and schedule risk in LNG-to-power projects globally.
So when evaluating JERA’s proposed timeline and cost estimates for Hawaii, it’s worth noting that the FSRU component is essentially a placeholder dependent on a vendor agreement that doesn’t yet exist — and that vendor, not JERA, would bear primary responsibility for delivering it on time and on budget.
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